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coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has placed the scien-
tific community in the spotlight. The repeated claims 
and emphasis of governments across the world on 
science-based decision-making raise important politi-
cal and ethical questions. Nevertheless, before these 
can be addressed with credibility and implemented in 
practice, it is imperative that the assumptions they rest 
on, and which regard the relevant material objective 
issues, are derived through good science (Goldacre 
2010), that is scientific inquiry which is methodologi-
cally sound and rigorous (Smaldino and McElreath 
2016). If scientists make claims which are used to 
drive or justify drastic social measures that alter the 
usual course of life and those claims turn out to be 
vastly inaccurate, the generally high level of trust in 
scientists (MORI 2017) and their credibility can be 
fatally undermined, effecting damage to all: research, 
the scientific community, and the beneficiaries of sci-
entific advice, such as the general public. Thus, in the 
present article we examine the quality of the specific 
modelling work by Ferguson et al. (2020) (henceforth 
referred to as the Imperial Model) which was vastly 
influential in directing the United Kingdom’s policy 
decisions in response to the COVID-19 crisis.
Right at the outset it is important to clearly delin-
eate the scope, premises, and limits of our analysis. 
Firstly, none of the criticisms raised herein emerge 
from post hoc acquired knowledge, that is we only 
discuss the quality of science given the information 
available at the time, rather than retrospectively, i.e. 
in hindsight. Indeed, most of the criticisms we level 
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relate to the fundamental, methodological aspects of 
the work. Secondly, our analysis should not be inter-
preted as criticism of any specific policy. It is impera-
tive to understand that policy-making inherently 
involves the consideration of extra-scientific issues, 
for example of axiological and moral nature, to say 
nothing of the fact that the relevant scientific consid-
erations involve a much broader range of disciplines 
than epidemiology, such as economics, sociology, 
behavioural science, and many others.
Major Methodological Criticisms
The aim of the present article is not to analyse 
exhaustively all aspects of the Imperial Model. Rather 
we focus on a few keystone modelling choices and 
explain the fundamental methodological concerns 
associated with them. In this section these are exam-
ined one by one in turn.
The Trouble With R
Throughout the ongoing crisis much emphasis, both 
in the context of policymaking and the understand-
ing of the relevant epidemiology, has been placed on 
the so-called R number, i.e. the effective reproduction 
number of the infection (not to be confused with R0, 
the basic reproduction number which itself is a source 
of much confusion even in the scientific community 
[Delamater et al. 2019]). The reason for this is quite 
clear: the effective reproduction number is the num-
ber of new cases of infection in the population gener-
ated from its current state. In this section we would 
like to highlight two main (but by no means the only 
two) methodological flaws in the modelling of Fergu-
son et al. (Ferguson et al. 2020) which pertain to the 
R number: (i) the failure to account for the so-called 
friendship paradox, and (ii) the inherent bias in the 
manner the R value is estimated.
The Friendship Paradox
The friendship paradox is a well-known phenomenon 
first reported by Feld (1991) in social networks. Suc-
cinctly, the apparent paradox stems from the observa-
tion that on average most people have fewer friends 
than their friends do. It is readily explained by the 
observation that popular individuals (those with 
many friends) are more likely to be in one’s friends 
group than those who are unpopular. The same phe-
nomenon applies in many other networks defined by 
relationships and unsurprisingly invited a lot of study 
in the spread of disease in particular (Amaku et  al. 
2015; Christakis and Fowler 2010). Despite the major 
effects that the phenomenon can have across relation-
ship networks of different structures irrespective of 
the R number, it is virtually unaccounted for by the 
Imperial Model. The only, vastly over-simplistic and 
coarse due paid to it, comes in the form of assump-
tions (we discuss how different assumptions are jus-
tified and approached more generally in Section 2.2) 
on sub-population interaction frequencies in a small 
number of different environments (e.g. schools or 
workplaces) (Ferguson et al. 2020).
Inherent Bias in the R Number
The next key omission in the treatment of the repro-
duction number is a subtler one and it concerns the 
discord between the manner in which the number is 
estimated and the manner in which the said estimate 
is thereafter employed in prediction. To start with the 
former, the R number estimate is based on population 
level statistics of, amongst others, recorded deaths, 
hospital admissions, and positive tests for the virus, 
over time. Thus, to state the obvious, the estimate is 
based on the dynamics of the disease amongst those 
who have already been infected. The important sub-
tlety to observe here is that this is invariably not a 
randomly drawn subset of the population. Rather, if 
certain sub-populations are more prone to infection, 
it is the effective reproduction rate amongst this sub-
population that is being estimated, which is always 
higher than what the effective reproduction rate 
would be across the entire population. This observa-
tion has important consequences on modelling pre-
dictions. Firstly, it is clearly fallacious to assume the 
same R number to arbitrary non-infected individu-
als–the predictions of the numbers of deaths, hospi-
talizations, etc. are all going to be biased upwards, 
i.e. be overestimates. Moreover, the actual statistics 
for any of the aforementioned are bound by the size 
of the susceptible demographic. In the absence of 
the relevant virological understanding of this size, or 
more precisely the distribution of susceptibility (in a 
broad sense) across the population, the predictions 
of a model which ignores this fact cannot be taken 
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seriously. Yet, this is precisely what we saw with the 
work of Ferguson et al.
To give a specific example as a means of illustrat-
ing our point, consider the scenario whereby lock-
down is introduced, of the type indeed adopted by 
the government of the United Kingdom. What can 
be expected to happen is a drastic reduction in the 
transmission of the virus in the general population 
and with it a dramatic drop in the R number (which 
is indeed what has been observed). Following this 
initial period, it is possible that significant transmis-
sion is confined to certain environments only, such 
as hospitals and care homes for the elderly. Since, as 
noted earlier, the R number is estimated from those 
already infected, this means that the number can rise 
even to the levels preceding the lockdown. However, 
as already explained, the infection now by design, so 
to speak, being confined to a specific (and small in 
size) sub-population, this infection rate has little bear-
ing on the risk for the general public as a whole.
As emphasized right at the outset of the present 
article, our analysis focuses on the quality of the 
modelling decisions in the context of the informa-
tion available at the time, i.e. without the benefit of 
hindsight, and the lack of accounting for the high-
lighted phenomenon is a major flaw regardless of the 
actual unfolding of events thereafter. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to observe that the aforementioned bias 
may be used to explain what to some is the surpris-
ingly good outcome of the Swedish policy. Recall that 
Sweden did not impose a lockdown but merely volun-
tary social distancing recommendations, keeping res-
taurants, cafes, bars, and many schools open. Yet, as 
of the end of May (when the United Kingdom started 
relaxing the lockdown) Sweden had recorded 4,350 
deaths with COVID-19, compared to at least 39,045 
in England—circa 4.2 vs 7.0 deaths per 10,000 peo-
ple. In short, it is likely that the subset of the popu-
lation at high risk is relatively small and the initially 
exponential rise in infections and deaths inherently 
peaks far earlier than in a homogeneously susceptible 
population.
Assumptions, Latent Variables, and Absence of 
Validation
As with virtually any practical epidemiological 
model, the model used by Ferguson et  al. contains 
a number of latent parameters. These parameters 
describe (explicitly or implicitly) various char-
acteristics of the disease itself, as well as relevant 
characteristics of the population studied, interaction 
patterns within it, etc., but which are not directly 
observable (unlike, say, the number of excess 
deaths). Rather than being directly observed, latent 
parameters have to be either (i) “manually” pre-
set based on the best understanding of the relevant 
phenomenology (with a further caveat which will 
be discussed shortly), or (ii) inferred from observ-
able data (e.g. through the usual process of vali-
dation on withheld data and maximum likelihood 
hypothesis choice). Alarmingly, neither of these 
two approaches were followed in the setting of the 
parameters in the model of Ferguson et al.
As just suggested, the list of latent parameters 
which were set in a rather ad hoc manner by Fergu-
son et al. is rather long (e.g. the value of R0, rela-
tive infectiousness of symptomatic vs asymptomatic 
individuals, the parameters and type of distribu-
tion of individuals’ infectiousness, etc.) and there 
is little benefit to discussing them all exhaustively 
given that our aim is to highlight the general meth-
odological concerns regarding the work. Instead, 
we highlight an illustrative example, and having 
already introduced it previously, we may as well 
use for this purpose the R number (noting that the 
issues discussed now are different from those which 
were at the focus in the previous section). In par-
ticular, what the authors of the original report did 
was to adopt the uniform R value of 2.4, which is 
the estimate based on early epidemiological mod-
elling (Riou and Althaus 2020) applied on the first 
425 recorded cases in Wuhan (Li et al. 2020). Con-
sidering that the effective reproduction number is a 
function not only of the relevant virological factors 
(e.g. how infectious the virus is) but also of envi-
ronmental and social variables (amongst others: 
weather (Tan et al. 2005), population demographics, 
number and nature of social interactions, and indi-
viduals’ hygiene practices), in which Wuhan and the 
United Kingdom differ significantly, this is clearly 
an entirely inappropriate modelling choice. Given 
when the report was published, it is also a most 
curious choice too: there had already been sufficient 
data from the United Kingdom which could have 
been used or indeed data from a number of other 
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European countries which would have been more 
credibly argued as a sound starting point (Saglietto 
et al. 2020; Roques et al. 2020).
System Complexity and Sensitivity Analysis
In no small part, the challenge of modelling the 
spread of infectious disease emerges from the com-
plexity of the modelled system. As we noted in 
the previous section, the evolution of the system 
is governed by a large set of parameters including 
population demographics, social interaction pat-
terns, infection susceptibility variability, and many 
others, with intricate interactions between these and 
highly non-linear effects on the ultimate outcomes 
of interest (e.g. the number of hospitalizations or 
deaths). A consequence of this complexity is that in 
some cases reliable inference or validation of model 
parameters is not possible, for example due to the 
unavailability of sufficient amounts of data required 
for validation. With respect to this, as a note of 
elementary principle, it is firstly important to note 
that such limitations do not give the modeller the 
licence to make ad hoc choices and then use the 
emergent predictions as basis for recommendations 
on, say, policy issues. A model which is known 
not to be underlain by soundly set parameters is 
untrustworthy. What can be done, however, in an 
effort to gain as much insight into the model and 
the modelled phenomenon as possible, is to subject 
the predictions to sensitivity analysis (Blower and 
Dowlatabadi 1994; Drechsler 1998). In other words, 
the principle is that of examining the relationship 
between model parameters and the ultimate predic-
tions. If this sensibility with respect to a particular 
parameter (or indeed a set of parameters) is low, an 
argument can be made that even if its exact value 
is not known, the corresponding effect on the pre-
diction is low, leading to a possibly useful model 
and instructive error bounds. On the other hand, if 
the aforementioned sensitivity is high, i.e. if small 
changes to a latent parameter effect large changes to 
the ultimate predictions, the model can be rejected 
as one of little practical use. Worryingly, little such 
analysis was performed by Ferguson et al.—the sen-
sitivity to most parameters was not considered at all 
while for a couple of others only a highly limited 
range of values was examined (e.g. R0 between 2.0 
and 2.6).
Oversimplicity of Virological Modelling
As was known from just about the very onset of the 
disease, COVID-19 is caused by a single-stranded 
RNA virus (SARS-CoV-2). This type of virus is 
well-known to be highly susceptible to copying 
errors (Duffy 2018) and thus the development of new 
strains, the prevalence of which in the population is 
driven by environmental factors (including social 
policy, individuals’ behaviour, weather etc.). New 
mutations can significantly differ in how infectious or 
deadly they are in comparison with the known ones 
(or more broadly, the existing ones), as well as in 
various other characteristics such as when the peak of 
infectiousness of an individual occurs relative to the 
onset of symptoms, asymptomatic transmission, etc.
While there can be little doubt that the modelling 
of this phenomenon is most challenging indeed, the 
failure to account for it should be itself sufficient to 
reject a model for making concrete predictions which 
affect policy (be it directly or indirectly, e.g. by affect-
ing the mood of the public, the perceived risk, etc.). 
In a sentence, the possibly insurmountable difficulty 
of accounting for an important factor in modelling 
does not give one the licence to omit it while know-
ing that the predictions may be a very poor match to 
reality.
The importance of high mutability of single-
stranded RNA viruses is particularly important in the 
context of the kind of policy decisions which were 
made based on modelling such as the one primarily 
discussed herein. In particularly, under what one may 
call “normal” circumstances, the prevalence of strains 
which have more severe health effects (including 
death) tends to reduce over time for a simple reason: 
the ability of very ill people to go about their normal 
lives is (virtually by definition) reduced and so is (on 
average) their contact with other individuals. Severely 
ill people will not partake in social and leisure activi-
ties, will limit or displace their shopping, etc. On the 
other hand, those infected with strains which cause 
milder illness, or indeed no symptoms at all, will 
change their behaviour little, if at all, increasing the 
prevalence of the infection with the strain. However, 
environmental changes, say such as those affected 
by the imposition of a lockdown, alter the picture, 
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possibly slowing down the downward spiral of the 
prevalence of the more severe strains.
Ethical Implications
In the previous section we described some of the 
most serious methodological flaws in a crucial report 
that influenced the U.K. government’s response to 
COVID-19. The nature and seriousness of these 
flaws, that is the fact that they went uncorrected, 
firstly highlights major structural challenges with the 
manner governments obtain scientific advice, crucial 
in, if not every then virtually every policy made today. 
Questions such as whether the body of scientist advis-
ers is representative of the scientific community at 
large, whether the breadth of their expertise domains 
is adequate for the specific problems faced by the 
government, as well as whether the advisers have suf-
ficient autonomy and freedom to voice their genuine 
opinions, should all be asked and investigated.
Another particularly worrying ethical consequence 
of the Imperial Model, and thus also of the system 
which allowed the aforementioned methodological 
flaws to pass unchallenged, concerns the effect that its 
predictions had on the overall perception of the pan-
demic in the country (and wider; the model has been 
cited as influencing public policies in other countries 
as well)—the legislature and the public alike. The 
catastrophic predictions of the model, publicized 
widely by politicians, the mainstream media, and in 
most cases genuinely concerned but lay members of 
the public, have affected public policy decision-mak-
ing both directly and indirectly. The predictions have 
served to increase the political cost of harm associ-
ated with COVID-19, thus de facto devaluing harm 
from other causes. Indeed, the profoundly negative 
impact of COVID-19 measures on the mental health 
of the population has been widely documented (Pfef-
ferbaum and North 2020; Liu et al. 2020) as has the 
in- crease in non-CoOVID related mortality and mor-
bidity (Docherty et al. 2020; Maringe et al. 2020).
Further to health-related ethical concerns, are con-
cerns which regard political decision-making and 
legislation. The backdrop created by the Imperial 
Model’s predictions has facilitated a narrative which 
unduly elevates science, that is scientists, to the 
policy-making role epitomized by the oft-repeated, 
yet meaningless slogan “following the science” (or 
a variation thereof) (Mercuri 2020). Science, by its 
very nature and realm of inquiry, cannot fulfil this 
duty for policy-making demands value-based judge-
ments, which are inherently extra-scientific (Aran-
delovíc 2021). This was recently expressed well by 
Lavazza and Farina (2020):
Given the dangerousness and the extent of the 
contagion, almost no one has questioned the 
suggestions that these experts have advised pol-
icymakers to implement. Quite often the latter 
explicitly sought experts’ advice and justified 
unpopular measures (e.g., restricting people’s 
freedom of movement) by referring to the epis-
temic authority attributed to experts. (1)
Echoing our thoughts on the matter, they go on:
… when values are involved it is no longer just 
a matter of finding the “best technical solution,” 
but also of making discretionary choices that 
affect citizens and that cannot be imposed solely 
on the basis of epistemic authority. (1)
Yet, this elevation of technical authority was not 
uniform or consistent. Scientists who voiced disa-
greements over the government’s choices and who 
proposed alternative means of response to the crisis, 
such as Kulldorff et al. (2020), have, in spite of their 
established technical credibility, been side-lined at 
best, and not infrequently vilified as COVID deniers, 
as uncaring individuals, as people willing to let the 
elderly die1, etc. Not only is this response logically 
inconsequent and unfair to these scientists but it is 
also egregiously dangerous—a lack of freedom to 
debate scientific questions can only stifle our under-
standing of a phenomenon and thus impair our abil-
ity as a society to deal with the challenge we face. As 
Mercuri (2020) asks: “Is it fair to say one is ‘follow-
ing the science’ if only a small group of scientists or 
disciplines is included in the conversation?” (1576).
The same risk aversion unduly directed towards a 
single source of risk, namely the disease (COVID-
19) itself, which was instrumental in guiding policy 
decisions in response to the epidemic, has also pro-
foundly affected the policymaking process itself. Mir-
roring the aforementioned phenomenon in this aspect 
1 See e.g. https:// www. inves torsc hroni cle. co. uk/ news/ 2020/ 12/ 
18/ how- covid- 19- could- lead- the- way- to- better- healt hcare/.
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as well, the highly troubling manner in which this 
has happened passed with little notice by most. Lord 
Sumption, a highly distinguished intellectual and a 
former senior judge who sat on the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom between 2012 and 2018, was 
one of a small number of prominent individuals who 
spoke out. In addition to highlighting the importance 
of non-scientific factors in public policy decision-
making that we discussed earlier, Lord Sumption 
described a number of legal transgressions of the 
state (both its legislative and executive elements), 
including a lack of legal basis for a number of rules 
imposed on the population Sumption (2020). In most 
circumstances, actions like these would have pro-
voked a vociferous public outcry. That they did not 
do so in this case, at least initially, does not reflect 
an indifference of the public—quite on the contrary. 
The initial reaction of the British public, that of quiet 
obedience (Jackson et  al. 2020), was made possible 
only by presenting as the alternative choice the path 
to the cataclysmic state predicted by Ferguson et  al. 
As noted by Furedi (2008):
… the current conceptualization of resilience 
assumes that vulnerability is the defining con-
dition of social life. One likely consequence of 
this approach is the reinforcement of the passive 
side of public life. (645)
Unsurprisingly, when in time the public perceived 
a discrepancy between what “the scientists” (in 
inverted commas, to highlight the simplistic and mis-
leading messaging of the government and the media, 
as discussed earlier) were predicting and the actual 
state of affairs, the behaviour of the public changed. 
Indeed, Smith et  al. (2020) found: “Decreased per-
ceived effectiveness of lockdown measures was 
linked to non-adherence” and “Non-adherence was 
also linked with decreased perceived severity of 
COVID-19” (41).
At the start of this article, we reflected the data 
which consistently over a period of years show that 
the scientific community enjoys high regard from the 
general public (see Section  1). However, this trust 
should not be taken for granted. It is not difficult to 
see how many of the actions of scientists which we 
raised concerns about in this section can only serve 
to erode the said trust (Arandelovíc 2017). Some of 
these actions may be genuine mistakes. While these 
mistakes may point to structural problems, which 
ought to be addressed in due time, the mistakes 
themselves should be judged with caution, balance, 
and humility—mistakes do happen. However, dis-
honesty about mistakes should not be accepted and 
it is actions of this nature that can effect the great-
est harm by virtue of long-term loss of confidence in 
scientists or worse yet, science itself. The manner in 
which mortality has been reported during the crisis 
provides a poignant example. Initially, amongst other 
data, the COVID-19 Data Dashboard (see https:// 
coron avirus. data. gov. uk/) reported for England all 
deaths of people who have ever had a positive CoV-2 
test; subsequently a change was made to include only 
those individuals who have had a positive within 28 
days of death (the reasons for the change are largely 
inconsequential here, though the reader will prob-
ably be able to infer them following the reading of 
the present paragraph). This (the former more so than 
the latter) is a perfectly principled way of record-
ing mortality for the purposes of surveillance or the 
analysis of COVID-19 specific mortality. However, it 
is entirely incorrect to describe these deaths as being 
“from COVID-19.” Only a robust statistical analysis 
can provide a sound estimate of the proportion of 
the deaths recorded in the manner described which 
are attributable to the disease. Yet, we found that in 
the period of up to September 2020, out of 14,260 
references to COVID-19 mortality on the BBC web 
site, 10,050 (> 70 per cent) used the phrasing “died 
from” or “died of” rather than “died with.” We found 
the same on all mainstream media websites; to give 
another example, out of 1637 references in the same 
period on The Telegraph web site, 1415 (> 86 per 
cent) said “died from” or “died of.” While this could 
at first sight be brushed off as a reflection of journal-
ists’ lack of scientific and statistical training, even a 
slightly more careful examination of the issue reveals 
a different picture—the same justification cannot 
be employed to defend some highly prominent and 
accomplished scientists who repeatedly use the same 
phrasing. Consider the words of Prof. Spiegelhalter 
on BBC’s Newsnight (18 December 2020):
I was surprised to see that more people have 
been killed by COVID-19 than civilians were 
killed in the U.K. during the Second World War. 
That is 64, 000 were killed in 6 years. We have 
had more than that who have died from COVID. 
(pp, all emphasis is ours)
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Spiegelhalter was not referring here to any sophis-
ticated statistical analyses or estimates but rather the 
raw “died with COVID” figures at the time. Such 
distortion of truth cannot be a mistake, not coming 
from somebody as scientifically credible as Spiegel-
halter. Thus, and relating this to our aforementioned 
discussion of changes in the public’s obedience of the 
government’s COVID-19 measures, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that this is a purposeful attempt 
to make observations fit predictions.
Conclusions
The overarching aim of this article was to bring to 
attention a number of serious concerns about the 
quality of scientific advice used by governments in 
making important policy decisions and highlight the 
serious ethical consequences. Our specific focus was 
on the recent modelling work done by Ferguson et al. 
at Imperial College London, which was instrumen-
tal in driving the U.K. government’s handling of the 
ongoing COVID-19 epidemic. In particular, we dis-
cussed a number of major flaws in the aforementioned 
modelling. Importantly, none of our criticisms rely on 
post hoc knowledge, i.e. on knowledge unavailable 
to the modellers at the time. Rather they all concern 
issues which are of a fundamental, methodological 
nature. Some of these are subtler than others, but all 
of them affect the model’s predictions in a manner 
which render its practical usefulness all but void.
Our hope is that the issues we raised will be taken 
constructively and in a manner which will effect 
improvement in future. Most proximally, processes 
which ensure better quality scientific advice should 
be put into place, as policymaking premised on ill-
founded science cannot itself be good. Specifically, 
the presented analysis of a number of serious meth-
odological flaws highlights the need for more open-
ness and scrutiny of scientific advice given to gov-
ernments, for example by instituting something akin 
to peer review. Secondly, given that policy decisions 
influenced by the Imperial Model have already been 
made and that the effects of these decisions con-
tinue to be assessed in ways which are underlain by 
at least some of the flawed assumptions and model-
ling choices we highlighted, particular care has to be 
taken in interpreting observations as the undertaken 
measures are phased out.
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